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ABSTRACT 
This article looks at the way the Constitution of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas in its 
chapter on citizenship combines elements of both ius solis as well as ius sanguinis but fails to 
apply either of these principles consistently. This can result in the de iure statelessness of 
children born to Bahamian parents overseas, and in the de iure and/or de facto statelessness of 
children born in The Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents. The article further analyses the 
proposals for amendments to the Constitution as presented by Prime Minister Perry Christie in 
2014, demonstrating that some of these issues will be retained. It argues that the Constitution’s 
exclusionary approach to citizenship creates an incompatibility between the state’s expectation of 
loyalty of its citizens and the citizens’ ability to identify with the nation. 
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INTRODUCTION  
This article has evolved out of a contribution 
to a panel discussion on the subject of 
statelessness that was hosted by the School of 
English Studies and the School of Social 
Sciences at the College of The Bahamas in 
April 2014, in which I attempted to outline 
the incompatibility of our state’s expectation 
of loyalty and identification from its people 
on the one hand, with its jealous guarding of 
the privilege of citizenship on the other hand, 
for the latter contributes to the dilemma of 
statelessness, in which many individuals in 
today’s Bahamas find themselves. This 
discrepancy, enshrined in The Bahamas’ 
Constitution and only partially addressed in 
the report submitted by the Constitutional 
Commission in July 2013, I argued, has the 
potential to alienate individuals, thus 
preventing them from becoming participating 
or contributing citizens. The full title of the 
document was Report of the Constitutional 
Commission into a Review of The Bahamas 
Constitution. It will be referred to throughout 
this paper as the 2013 Report; the 
Commission itself, which was chaired by 
Sean McWeeney, will be referred to as the 
McWeeney Commission, to avoid any 
confusion with previous commissions. 
In July 2014, Prime Minister Perry Christie 
announced a constitutional referendum, 
originally scheduled for November 2014. In 
September 2014, Bernard Nottage, Minister of 
National Security and Leader of Government 
Business in the House of Assembly, 
announced a postponement of this referendum 
to a date yet to be decided upon. Under the 
overarching theme of equality between men 
and women, the proposed amendments are 
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addressing some of the issues regarding 
citizenship highlighted during our panel 
discussion, as three of the four proposed bills, 
if passed, would make changes to that 
particular chapter of the Constitution. It is 
important to note, however, that especially the 
first of these four bills presented to parliament 
falls far short of the McWeeney 
Commission’s recommendation. Despite this, 
and despite the delay in the process, these four 
bills mark not only the Christie 
administration’s first action taken as a result 
of the 2013 Report, they also directly address 
questions of citizenship. It is therefore 
imperative to include them in any discussion 
on statelessness, citizenship and the 
construction of the Bahamian nation. 
The next chapter will examine the Bahamian 
Constitution’s citizenship provisions and their 
inconsistent application of the principles of 
both ius soli and ius sanguinis. The 2013 
Report spoke to this, and made explicit 
reference to the possibility of this resulting in 
persons being rendered stateless (p. 96.). 
Apparent challenges in the civil service seem 
to compound this problem, because not all 
cases are being processed equally or in a 
timely manner, and while the Bahamas 
Nationality Act (1973) could provide a 
practical solution, it only does so at the 
Minister’s discretion. 
Following that, I will discuss the proposed 
constitutional amendments in the context of 
statelessness. While being heralded as 
necessary to achieve equality between the 
sexes in The Bahamas, the first three bills are 
important also in terms of children’s rights, 
immigration, and national identity, as they 
address Articles 8, 9, 10, and 14 of the 
Constitution, which are all part of the chapter 
on citizenship. However, as they fall short of 
the McWeeney Commission’s recommend-
ation, they may alleviate some of the 
problems, but they still enshrine scenarios that 
would result in children being born stateless. 
Finally, because I argue that the citizenship 
provisions in our Constitution are a telling 
example of how our Founding Fathers 
imagined the nation, I will take a broader look 
at the discrepancy between our constitutional 
constructions of what (and who) is Bahamian, 
and the evolving identities of Bahamian 
peoples independent of the Constitution. Out 
of necessity, a one-size-fits-all model was 
developed at Independence, and it was built 
with tools that were perhaps not even post-
colonial. Cognisant of the conflict potential 
rooted in a defective national identity, but 
seemingly unaware of the evolving and 
varying needs of especially the younger 
generations, the McWeeney Commission 
proposed a tightening of the post-colonial 
corset with the same old toolkit. Is the post-
colonial model of the nation-state still a 
timely one for The Bahamas? 
The Constitutional Construction of 
Citizenship 
After winning the 2012 general election, 
Christie appointed the McWeeney 
Commission, and mandated it to focus on, 
among other things, “the strengthening of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual, with a particular focus on 
citizenship provisions” (p. 5). The particular 
way in which the 2013 Report phrases this 
point suggests that the commissioners accept 
that citizenship is indeed a fundamental right 
of the individual. It would not be a far stretch 
to interpret that mandate as an uncomfortable 
admission that our Constitution effectively 
deprives certain individuals of this 
fundamental right, an admission that our 
Constitution may in fact generate 
statelessness. 
A 1954 United Nation Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons (2014) defines 
a stateless person as someone “who is not 
considered as a national by any State under 
operation of its law,” and it “provides 
important minimum standards of treatment”; 
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for instance, “it requires that stateless persons 
have the same right as citizens with respect to 
freedom of religion and education of their 
children,” and regarding other issues, “such as 
the right of association, the right to 
employment and … housing, it provides that 
stateless persons are to enjoy, at a minimum, 
the same treatment as other non-nationals” (p. 
3). This convention also makes provision for 
states to issue identity papers and travel 
documents for stateless persons present in 
them. The Bahamas is not a signatory state to 
this convention. 
A 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness (2014) is based on the principle 
that statelessness should be avoided, that 
statelessness ought to be prevented at birth, 
“by requiring States to grant citizenship to 
children born on their territory, or born to 
their nationals abroad, who would otherwise 
be stateless” (p. 3). The Bahamas is not a 
signatory State to this convention either. 
While the 1954 Convention was clearly still 
written bearing in mind the large number of 
Displaced Persons as a result of World War II, 
the 1961 Convention more clearly 
understands that statelessness in the modern 
world is often the result of worldwide 
migration, in particular where and when 
migrants’ countries of origin do not apply ius 
sanguinis consistently in their citizenship 
provisions, and destination countries do not 
subscribe to ius solis. In the case of The 
Bahamas, the incomplete application of either 
ius solis and/or ius sanguinis is further 
complicated by the Constitution’s different 
treatment of persons born before or after 
independence, its very traditional under-
standing of the institution of marriage, as well 
as the Constitution’s gender bias towards 
parents. The relevant articles of the Bahamian 
Constitution (1973) are Articles 3(2), 6, 7, 8, 
and 14(1). 
Article 7, which addresses persons born to 
non-citizen parents in the Bahamas after 
independence, is the one that long dominated 
the public discourse on the issue, because it is 
the provision that describes the “group that 
includes the numerically large native-born 
children of Haitian immigrants to The 
Bahamas” (2013 Report, p. 86). These 
children of immigrants—whether the parents 
are from Haiti or any other country—are not 
entitled to Bahamian citizenship at birth. In 
many cases, however, these children may well 
be entitled to their parents’ citizenship, 
though given the economic challenges of 
many immigrants in the Bahamas and the fact 
that only very few countries have effective 
diplomatic representation here, this may, in 
many cases, remain a purely theoretical 
entitlement. However, the Constitution also 
stipulates that such children of immigrants, 
“shall be entitled, upon making application on 
his attaining the age of eighteen years …, to 
be registered as a citizen of The Bahamas” 
(Bahamas Independence Order, 1973, Ch. 2, 
Art. 7). 
The McWeeney Commission recognises that 
this provision creates certain problems, 
primarily the uncertainty of such persons for 
the first eighteen years of their lives—plus 
whatever amount of time our government and 
civil service may need to process these 
applications once they are made. During this 
time, persons born in the Bahamas to two 
immigrant parents may well be stateless. 
Using the largest immigrant group, people of 
Haitian origin or descent, as an example, the 
McWeeney Commission observes that “the 
Haitian Constitution provides for persons to 
acquire nationality through descent but only if 
either of their parents is native born …” (2013 
Report, p. 96), concluding that in The 
Bahamas, third-generation immigrant children 
of Haitian descent are born stateless, and 
remain so for at least eighteen years of their 
lives. 
This, however, is a misinterpretation of the 
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Haitian Constitution and the use of the term 
native born in its English translation. In its 
original language, the Haitian Constitution 
does not say native born or otherwise suggest 
a requirement to mean born on Haitian soil; 
instead, when it grants citizenship to children 
either of whose parents “sont nés Haïtiens” 
(were born Haitian, Haitian Constitution, 
Article 11), the phrase refers to an 
unconditional application of ius sanguinis, an 
entitlement to citizenship by birth through 
parental lineage, but regardless of birthplace. 
Thus, theoretically, no child of Haitian 
immigrants, no matter how many generations 
removed from Haitian soil, should be 
stateless. However, many immigrants are 
unable to properly document this entitlement, 
and as a result remain de facto stateless. 
It is important to note that the McWeeney 
Commission acknowledged the urgency of the 
subject, advocating that “appropriate 
amendments should also be included to ensure 
that those persons born to Bahamians outside 
The Bahamas as well as persons born to non-
Bahamians in The Bahamas would not be 
rendered stateless” (2013 Report, p. 35). Yet 
the McWeeney Commission shied away from 
recommending an unconditional im-
plementation of ius solis and declared that it 
“does not recommend automatic citizenship 
by reason only of birth on Bahamian soil” 
(2013 Report, p. 22). In fact, it refused to 
address the matter in any meaningful way. 
Tasked with reviewing the Constitution in its 
entirety, the McWeeney Commission 
excluded Article 7 from its review, instead 
recommending “the appointment of a 
commission to consider further questions 
relating to nationality and the basis on which 
nationality should be acquired by children 
born in The Bahamas to non-Bahamian 
parents” (2013 Report, p. 35). No such 
commission has been appointed to date. 
Given the general climate of the Bahamian 
discourse on immigration, it may be 
instructive to look at citizenship and 
statelessness differently, and to illustrate how 
our Constitution can cause children of 
Bahamian descent to be rendered stateless. To 
this end, I will present a number of scenarios: 
1. Every person born in The Bahamas after 
independence “shall become a citizen of The 
Bahamas at the date of his birth if at that date 
either of his parents is a citizen of The 
Bahamas” (Bahamas Constitution, Art. 6). 
While this seems clear cut, the McWeeney 
Commission observes that this Article “seems 
to have been susceptible to an interpretation 
that is discriminatory in its effects. This 
results from what the Commission considers 
… to be the erroneous interpretation of the 
word ‘parents’ in this provision to include an 
unmarried Bahamian mother but not an 
unmarried Bahamian father” (2013 Report, p. 
90). This interpretation stems from Article 
14(1), “which erects the common law rule of 
filius nullius, (child of no father) …” (2013 
Report, p. 35). In terms of a plausible 
example, this could describe a child born in 
The Bahamas to a Bahamian father who is not 
married to the child’s mother—who is a 
citizen of a country that does not allow her to 
pass on her citizenship to her foreign-born 
children or who is stateless herself. 
2. Article 8 entitles the overseas-born children 
of married Bahamian fathers and unmarried 
Bahamian mothers to Bahamian citizenship 
by birth—unless these parents are Bahamian 
citizens by virtue of either Article 3(2) or 8, 
that is. These disqualifiers describe people 
who were, despite being born outside of The 
Bahamas, entitled to citizenship by birth; the 
difference between 3(2) and 8 is merely that 
the former applies to persons born before 
independence, the latter to persons born after 
independence. This exclusionary definition of 
who is prevented from passing on citizenship 
to their children perhaps also explains the 
McWeeney Commission’s pivotal 
misinterpretation of the term native-born in 
S. B. Aranha. Citizenship as a Fundamental Right.   11 
The International Journal of Bahamian Studies  Vol. 21, #1 (2015) 
the English translation of the Haitian 
Constitution. 
In terms of a real-world example, this 
describes my own son. I was born abroad, 
prior to Independence, because my father was 
temporarily working abroad. This makes me a 
citizen by virtue of Article 3(2) of the 
Constitution. My son was born while I was 
completing graduate studies which are still 
not available in The Bahamas. Unless our 
children are, by virtue of ius solis in their 
place of birth, or the citizenship laws of their 
mothers’ countries, or a second citizenship of 
their fathers’, eligible for a citizenship other 
than the Bahamian one, they could be 
rendered stateless—and while ius solis is 
quite common in the Americas, it is quite 
uncommon outside of our hemisphere. 
3. Article 9 entitles children born abroad to 
married Bahamian mothers to be registered as 
Bahamian citizens upon reaching the age of 
eighteen. This could also, potentially, leave 
them stateless in the interim. Imagine the 
following scenario: a Bahamian man who was 
born abroad but was entitled to citizenship by 
birth through Articles 3(2) or 8 of the 
Constitution, and his Bahamian wife have a 
child abroad. Both parents are Bahamian 
citizens, but neither is able to pass on their 
citizenship to children born abroad. Such 
scenarios are not purely hypothetical. During 
discussions about the proposed constitutional 
amendments, I have personally met several 
Bahamian families in precisely this situation. 
The examples above set out three scenarios 
that could leave children of Bahamian descent 
without any constitutional entitlement to 
Bahamian citizenship, even if their parents 
were only out of the country for a short period 
of time—for the singular moment of their 
child’s birth. Such cases have often been 
resolved favourably through the power given 
to the Minister in the Bahamas Nationality 
Act. In effect, these amount to individual 
cabinet decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
This approach introduces arbitrariness into the 
process, and undermines the principle of legal 
certainty. 
Furthermore, from anecdotal evidence it 
appears that the application of citizenship 
provisions by both the Department of 
Immigration as well as the Passport Office is 
not always consistent. This may be the result 
of unfamiliarity on the part of individual civil 
servants with the fine details of the various 
articles in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, and 
the practical possibilities offered by the 
Bahamas Nationality Act. It may also be the 
result of profiling, affording different 
treatment to different petitioners depending on 
their background. 
For example, I was told by a Bahamian 
woman who is married to a foreign man, and 
who gave birth in The Bahamas, that the 
Passport Office denied their child a passport. 
In this case, it is clear that our laws are not 
deficient, but that their consistent application 
has been hindered, which might be addressed 
by better training the officers in the relevant 
government agencies. 
Or, for example, I was advised by the 
Department of Immigration that my own son 
would have to wait until he was 18 to apply 
for citizenship under Article 9 of the 
Constitution. This, however, would have only 
applied if I were the mother, not the father. In 
fact, my son obtained his citizenship through 
the Minister’s discretion and the Bahamas 
Nationality Act, because as the overseas-born 
child of a married Bahamian man who is a 
citizen by virtue of Article 3(2), he had no 
constitutional claim to citizenship whatsoever. 
This case, again, highlights that some officers 
may require additional training, but such cases 
could also benefit from modernising our 
legislation and our Constitution. 
The McWeeney Commission’s recommend-
ations would remove the gender bias from the 
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Constitution’s chapter on citizenship, as had 
indeed been attempted by the Ingraham 
administration in 2002. Back then, the 
referendum required for constitutional change 
failed. 
The McWeeney Commission further 
recommended that the disqualifiers contained 
in the second part of Article 8 be removed. 
These define the prevention of overseas-born 
married Bahamian men and unmarried 
Bahamian mothers, who obtained their 
citizenship through Articles 3(2) or 8, to pass 
on their nationality to their own overseas-born 
children, and currently reduce them to the 
status of lesser Bahamians-with-a-small-b. 
This would have amounted to an 
unconditional adoption of the principle of ius 
sanguinis, and would have removed the legal 
possibility for children of Bahamian parents 
to be rendered stateless, regardless of their 
particular circumstances of birth. However, 
the refusal by both the McWeeney 
Commission as well as the Christie 
administration to tackle Article 7 at this time, 
can perpetuate constitutionally sanctioned 
statelessness for children born on Bahamian 
soil to non-Bahamian parents. 
Proposed Constitutional Amendments to 
Citizenship, 2014 
Towards the end of July 2014, Christie 
announced four separate bills to amend the 
Constitution, which have since been tabled 
and read in the House of Assembly. These 
bills propose to change Articles 8, 10, 14, and 
26 of the Constitution, and propose to delete 
Article 9. With the exception of Article 26, 
which is part of Chapter 3, Protections of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedom of the 
Individual, the other articles are all part of the 
chapter on citizenship. 
The constitutional referendum, which is 
required to change these provisions of the 
Constitution, was originally scheduled for 
November 6, 2014. However, Nottage 
announced in September that the referendum 
would be delayed. There are a number of 
reasons for this delay. The official 
justification is that the commission tasked 
with a national education campaign on these 
four bills requires more time to fulfil its 
mandate; this commission is now 
recommending a date between April and June 
2015. Christie is acutely aware of the careful 
balance he has to strike when championing an 
aspect of constitutional reform he himself 
helped defeat in 2002 when the Free National 
Movement administration, under Hubert 
Ingraham, put several proposals for 
constitutional change to the electorate in a 
referendum. He had no choice but to comply, 
because his main argument then was that 
the Bahamian people were simply saying 
that if these proposals are to be advanced, 
they must be advanced properly and 
carefully. The people, by voting No, were 
saying that if you try to rush the process, 
you not only deny sufficient time for 
public education and discussion but you 
also end up with a great many errors and 
flaws which only serve to complicate 
matters even further (Christie, 2002, para. 
7). 
However, it must also be noted that the bills 
are still in committee stage in the House of 
Assembly, and therefore, most likely, have 
not been finalised yet. It is inherently difficult 
to accurately educate the public on four bills 
that are still subject to change. Furthermore, 
after the fiasco of the 2013 so-called 
referendum on web-shops and a national 
lottery, the government clearly wants to 
ensure either the support or at the very least 
the neutrality of the so-called Bahamas 
Christian Council and similar groups whose 
initial reaction to constitutional reform was 
not favourable. Many of the arguments 
brought forward against the proposed 
constitutional changes were of such an 
unfounded nature that they do not warrant 
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inclusion in the current context, though a 
closer examination of the level of the public 
discourse surrounding this issue would make 
for another interesting paper. Yet, there are 
some valid concerns about the bills, and these 
may be another reason for a delay, should the 
government decide to improve the bills to 
better meet their declared purpose. As no 
updates on the bills’ evolving status have 
been shared with the public, they will be 
discussed as originally tabled in the House of 
Assembly, and as uploaded to the 
Government’s website on July 30, 2014. 
The first bill proposes to change Article 8 and 
also to delete Article 9. Article 8 currently 
entitles the overseas-born children of married 
Bahamian fathers as well as, because of the 
interplay with Article 14, unmarried 
Bahamian mothers to Bahamian citizenship, 
unless these parents are not themselves 
citizens by virtue of Articles 3(2) or 8, that is 
overseas-born citizens by descent and by 
birth. The proposed change would entitle the 
overseas-born children of all Bahamian 
mothers and fathers, except those who 
obtained their citizenship through Articles 
3(2), 8 or 10, to Bahamian citizenship. These 
exceptions have prompted Christie to describe 
the change as follows in the House of 
Assembly: “It is important to emphasize, 
however, that … the right to automatically 
pass on citizenship to one’s child will 
continue to operate only where the Bahamian 
parent is himself, or herself, a native-born 
Bahamian” (Rolle-Brown, 2014). However, as 
both the current as well as the proposed new 
Article 8 only exclude a small number of 
Bahamians through a kind of negative list, the 
use of the term native-born is misleading; 
Article 8, for instance, does not exclude 
Bahamian parents who obtained their 
citizenship through registration or 
naturalisation. Also, the Passport Office does 
not use that term. Their application forms 
speak to only three categories of citizenship: 
by birth, by registration, and by naturalisation. 
Citizens by virtue of Articles 3(2) or 8 are, in 
fact, citizens by birth, even though they were 
born abroad. 
The proposed deletion of Article 9 could be 
seen as a logical consequence of the changes 
to Article 8. At first glance, Article 9 would 
become redundant—or perhaps confusing—as 
it would give the overseas-born children of 
married Bahamian mothers two different, 
contradictory paths to citizenship, because 
currently, Article 9 entitles the overseas-born 
children of all married Bahamian mothers to 
be registered as citizens upon making such an 
application between the ages of 18 and 21. 
However, as the proposal is not to apply the 
changes retroactively, the deletion of Article 
9, without adding adequate protections into a 
new Article 8, would result in all such 
children born during the past 21 years losing 
their constitutional entitlement to citizenship. 
The government’s initial suggestion to 
compensate for this problem was to promise 
all affected individuals favourable 
consideration under the Bahamas Nationality 
Act. However, this would mean trading a 
constitutional entitlement for a politician's 
promise of favourable treatment using the 
Minister’s discretion. From an unofficial 
source I have seen a suggested second 
paragraph to the proposed new Article 8, 
which adds a provision that while the new 
entitlements are not retroactive, no old 
entitlements shall be lost either. It is 
unfortunate that this cannot be confirmed at 
this time, but it certainly would avert any 
problems arising out of simply deleting 
Article 9. 
It is also worth noting that, while parents 
under the old Article 8 were disqualified from 
passing on citizenship to their overseas-born 
children if they themselves were citizens by 
virtue of Articles 3(2) or 8 of the Constitution, 
the proposed new Article 8 will add Article 
10, that is registered citizens by virtue of 
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marriage to a Bahamian, to the list of 
disqualifiers. The old Article 9 did not contain 
any such disqualifiers, that is, the overseas-
born children of all married Bahamian women 
were covered by it. The result of these 
changes would be that while the overseas-
born children of most married Bahamian 
mothers would now be entitled to citizenship 
at birth, as opposed to the age of 18, the 
overall number of Bahamian women who can 
pass on citizenship to their overseas-born 
children in one way or another would actually 
decrease as a result of adding the new 
disqualifier of Article 10 and subjecting 
married mothers to the disqualifiers contained 
in Article 8 that were not contained in Article 
9. 
These confusing criteria—treating mothers 
and fathers, as well as married and unmarried 
persons differently, giving some citizenship 
by birth, and others only upon making 
application as adults, creating possible 
disqualifiers for some but not for others—
have given us citizenship provisions in the 
Constitution that are discriminatory on a 
number of levels, not just based on gender, 
and not always favouring men over women. 
The third bill, which proposes changes to 
Article 14, therefore, must be seen as acting in 
combination with the first bill. 
Article 14 erects the Common Law rule of 
filius nullius and explicitly refers to the entire 
chapter on citizenship. Its result has been that 
the children of unmarried Bahamian fathers 
and foreign mothers, whether born in the 
Bahamas or overseas, have been denied 
citizenship (2013 Report, p. 91). The pro-
posed change will abolish filius nullius in our 
Constitution, but will demand that the 
paternity of unmarried Bahamian fathers be 
proven. However, as it is this rule that entitles 
the overseas-born children of unmarried 
Bahamian mothers to citizenship, presenting 
the changes to Articles 8 and 9 in one bill, and 
the change to Article 14 in another, creates the 
risk of an unwanted outcome. If these changes 
are put to a referendum in two separate bills, 
it is theoretically possible for one bill to 
succeed and the other one to fail, and as 
constitutional referenda are binding, our 
legislators would not be able to alter that 
outcome, other than by putting yet another bill 
to the electorate in yet another referendum, 
and then hoping for its success. If the first bill 
were to fail, but the third one passed, the new 
constitutional reality would be that the 
overseas-born children of most Bahamian 
fathers would be entitled to citizenship, the 
overseas-born children of married Bahamian 
mothers would retain their entitlement to be 
registered upon making application as adults, 
but the overseas-born children of unmarried 
Bahamian mothers would lose any 
constitutional path to citizenship. 
Such a scenario cannot possibly be what the 
government hopes to achieve when putting 
these bills to referendum, even if it were 
prepared for an otherwise unsuccessful 
outcome of this constitutional reform 
exercise. In a town hall meeting at the College 
of The Bahamas, Retired Justice Rubie 
Nottage has argued that the McWeeney 
Commission’s interpretation of Article 54 of 
the Constitution is that one Constitutional 
Amendment Bill must not change more than 
one article of the Constitution, and that 
therefore the change to Article 14 must be 
presented in a separate bill. However, not only 
does Article 54 not make any such suggestion 
explicitly, but the first bill already sets a 
different precedent by combining the changes 
to Article 8 as well as the deletion of Article 9 
in a single bill. Furthermore, because Article 
14 begins with the words, “any reference in 
this chapter…,” it practically implores 
legislators that any changes made to it, ought 
to be made together with other proposed 
changes on which it has impact in the chapter 
on citizenship. 
The first and third constitutional amendment 
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bills are by far the most complex in their 
interplay and the details of the provisions. The 
second bill addresses Article 10, which 
currently allows foreign wives of Bahamian 
husbands to be registered as citizens. In line 
with the other constitutional provisions 
regarding citizenship, it phrases this as an 
entitlement. The proposed change would 
allow both foreign wives of Bahamian 
husbands as well as foreign husbands of 
Bahamian wives to be registered as citizens. 
Noteworthy are the newly added provisions 
supposed to guard against so-called 
marriages-of-convenience. While it might be 
argued that individuals in such marriages 
would primarily be interested in obtaining 
spousal permits or permanent residency with 
the right to work, many commentators 
expressed exaggerated concern about such 
scenarios. 
Consequently, the suggestion by Greg Moss, 
Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) Member of 
Parliament for the Marco City constituency, 
that gender equality in the issue of spousal 
citizenship could also be obtained by deleting 
spousal citizenship from the Constitution 
altogether, did not receive any serious 
consideration. Rather, Moss was criticised as 
being overly concerned about a back door for 
immigration, if not labelled as being against 
gender equality altogether. 
The McWeeney Commission emphasised that 
one reason to bring these first four bills 
forward is for The Bahamas to achieve 
compliance with two international 
agreements: the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), to which The 
Bahamas acceded in 1993, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), which The Bahamas signed 
on to in 2009. 
However, given the Christie administration’s 
divergence from the McWeeney 
Commission’s recommendation regarding 
Article 8, it can be questioned whether this 
change would in fact make the Constitution 
compliant with ICCPR. The McWeeney 
Commission recommended the removal of all 
the disqualifiers, entitling any child of a 
Bahamian parent to citizenship (2013 Report, 
p. 104). Christie’s proposal continues to 
discriminate against overseas-born 
Bahamians. Yet ICCPR not only addresses 
sex, but also birth in its long list of criteria to 
be protected against different treatment (Art. 
2, 24, 26).  
National Identity in The Bahamas: State 
vs. People 
Moving away from the citizenship provisions 
in the Bahamian Constitution, and the 
McWeeney Commission’s recommendations 
regarding the same, another issue addressed in 
the 2013 Report also speaks to the imagining 
of the nation: the national symbols:  
Although the national symbols are 
described in the Flag and Coat of Arms 
Act, the Commission is of the view that 
the foundational symbols—national flag, 
anthem and pledge—should be referred 
to in the Constitution and exhibited in a 
Schedule. This approach is commonly 
adopted in many of the world’s 
constitutions, including many in the 
Caribbean. The Commission thinks the 
rationale for this recommendation is self-
evident and really does not require further 
elucidation (p. 84). 
However, while the motivation behind the 
recommendation may indeed be self-evident, 
it is considerably less self-evident whether 
these recommended actions would actually 
yield any beneficial results. 
One of the commission members, Lester 
Mortimer, in a Dissenting Statement, called 
this recommendation “unnecessary verbiage” 
(2013 Report, p. 213). I would go a step 
further, because I do not just consider it 
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unnecessary but in fact hindering. Trying to 
construct national identity from the top down, 
through symbols that may well be perceived 
critically by some citizens, represents a 
thinking of the nation state as developed in 
19th century, pre-democratic Europe. Eric 
Hobsbawm noted about the conscious 
invention of tradition, and this may be 
transferred to national symbols as he was 
talking about the invention of traditions as a 
conscious effort of generating identity, that 
this  
succeeded mainly in proportion to its 
success in broadcasting on a wavelength 
to which the public was ready to tune in. 
Official new public holidays, ceremonies, 
heroes or symbols, which commanded the 
growing armies of the state’s employees 
and the growing captive public of 
schoolchildren, might still fail to 
mobilize the citizen volunteers if they 
lacked genuine popular resonance 
(Hobsbawm, pp. 263-264). 
Furthermore, Hobsbawm demonstrates how 
other multicultural immigrant societies 
capitalised on the absorption of immigrants’ 
“collective rituals” into their national canon 
(p. 279). 
However, in our post-colonial environment, 
such an identity cannot be prescribed from the 
top down; rather, the constitutional 
framework needs to invite and empower its 
citizens to build the still undefined nation 
which in turn needs to provide the space for a 
national identity to grow. Historically, both 
these necessities have been retarded through 
slavery and colonialism. Yet our official 
understanding of nation and citizenship has 
failed to address this birth defect. For 
instance, our constitution, though it requires 
the consent of the people to effect most 
constitutional change, was never consented to 
by the people in the first place, but came 
handed down from the coloniser instead. 
Earlier, I have outlined the inconsistency of 
the logic behind the citizenship provisions in 
the Constitution. The granting of this 
fundamental right was imagined narrowly. 
These provisions, however, no longer serve us 
well in the 21st century. We must come to 
terms with migratory realities that the 
Bahamas alone cannot significantly influence 
by treating it exclusively as an immigration 
issue and failing to simultaneously understand 
it as an emigration issue in the countries of 
origin. We must also act on the realisation 
that legally codified gender bias is not only no 
longer acceptable, but that many of us have 
difficulties understanding how it ever was 
acceptable in the first place. 
The 1973 Constitution paternalistically 
imagines a nation of—and assumes 
responsibility for—its subjects as centralised, 
without local government. It imagines that 
this nation accepts the various savings clauses 
and exemptions provided for in the 
Constitution, which enable old colonial laws 
to remain in effect even if they might violate 
what were recognised to be fundamental 
rights in 1973, and which give Parliament the 
authority to still pass new discriminatory 
laws, as has most recently been highlighted by 
the debate about the 2014 Gaming Bill, 
Gaming Regulations, and Gaming House 
Operator Regulations. 
Contrary to statements made by Andre 
Rollins, PLP Member of Parliament for the 
Fort Charlotte constituency and former 
Chairman of the Gaming Board, the last 
Lotteries and Gaming Act did not originate 
with the colonial United Bahamian Party 
regime, but dates from 1969, when the PLP 
was preparing the nation for independence. 
However, the Founding Fathers could not yet 
imagine Bahamians as independent, 
participating citizens themselves responsible 
for their nation. In my view, the McWeeney 
Commission’s recommendations also fall 
short of this vision; their approach is 
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patchwork only. In crucial points, the 
McWeeney Commission hides behind the 
regional averages; they do not dare to be the 
truly progressive vanguard of the region. 
While some of the various constitutional 
injustices are addressed, these tend to be the 
ones expected not to be controversial. If 
opposition from vocal quarters is to be feared, 
however, the 2013 Report either denies the 
need for reform, or pushes the task down the 
road to future commissions yet to be 
appointed, as they did with Article 7. Instead, 
they prescribe to Bahamians the placebo of a 
ready-made identity by recommending the 
addition of the national symbols, such as the 
Pledge of Allegiance, to the Constitution: 
I pledge my allegiance to the flag and to 
the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, 
For which it stands, 
one people united in love and service. 
Asking how successful the black-gold-and-
aquamarine flag, and all the pledges made to 
it have been thus far in inspiring the citizens 
of this country to be “united in love and 
service,” is a rhetorical question. In a nation 
that overprotects access to citizenship, thus 
excluding many potential Bahamians from 
participating but instead condemning them “to 
personal destinies of isolation and relative 
deprivation” (Marshall, 1979, cited in 2013 
Report, p. 98), such pledges can sound 
contrived. If we do not understand the value 
that citizens can add to building the nation, 
we will cause damage to our democracy. 
To illustrate this lack of understanding, I will 
use an experience I had with the Department 
of Immigration. My wife and I had to apply 
for citizenship for our overseas-born son 
through the Bahamas Nationality Act, that is, 
we were at the mercy of the Minister’s 
discretion, because I myself am a citizen by 
virtue of Article 3(2) of the Constitution. The 
Immigration Officer asked us why we wanted 
him to have Bahamian citizenship; he then 
continued to give the answer himself: “To 
enjoy the rights and privileges of a Bahamian 
citizen.” Instead, I offered, that I wanted my 
son to feel a sense of stewardship for the land 
in which he lives and, as he grows up, to feel 
motivated to contribute towards its progress. 
However, that notion deviating from the civil 
service’s understanding of the relationship 
between the state and its citizens, the officer 
nonetheless wrote on the form, “to enjoy the 
rights and privileges of a Bahamian citizen.” 
Furthermore, indications that our democracy 
is in a more fragile state than we like to admit 
are also visible. After general elections, we 
often cite the high percentage of the official 
voter turnout as proof of a strong democracy. 
For 2012, that number was 90.4%. However, 
this is measured only against the number of 
registered voters. If that number were 
measured against the 2010 census, taking into 
consideration the average rate of population 
growth to adjust for figures for the year of 
these last elections, we see that the 
registration rate amongst adult Bahamians is 
approximately 82%, meaning that only 74% 
of eligible voters cast a ballot. This also 
means that the PLP, which holds 79% of the 
seats in the House of Assembly, thanks to the 
first-past-the-post system, despite only 
receiving 49% of the popular vote, was really 
only elected by 36% of the adult Bahamian 
population. If we, for a moment, look at the 
overall adult population residing in The 
Bahamas, regardless of citizenship, we have a 
political system in which only 61% of adults 
participate in elections, and where we are 
governed by a party that was voted in by only 
30% of the adult population. Yet the 
McWeeney Commission, showing its nature 
as a politically appointed body, endorses the 
system which skews results as dramatically as 
demonstrated, denying that proportional 
representation would render “democratic 
dividends over the first-past-the-post system” 
(2013 Report, p. 40). 
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These examples demonstrate that we do not 
see the value of citizens as potential 
contributors to the Bahamas. Rather we fear 
the risks of having to be responsible for their 
welfare as dependents of or liabilities to the 
commonwealth. However, our nation is not a 
finished project, and I dare say a finished 
project cannot even be the goal. Rather, each 
generation’s journey is that generation’s 
reward and legacy, the foundation for the next 
generation. We must therefore invite all 
potential Bahamians to take part in imagining 
a better Bahamas, to take part in building it 
brick by brick. This invitation can only take 
the form of extending fundamental rights to 
everyone, to ensure that every person can feel 
safe in the Bahamas, regardless of their 
genealogy or other characteristics. 
The suspicion with which dual nationals are 
viewed also highlights this fundamental flaw 
in our thinking about citizens as potential 
contributors. It has surfaced at several town 
hall meetings conducted by the McWeeney 
Commission as part of its educational effort 
about the referendum. One hypothetical 
problem frequently brought up, both by the 
commissioners as well as by members of the 
audience, is the question of a dual national’s 
loyalty in the event of a war. Despite the 2013 
Report’s recommendation to relax the rules 
regarding dual citizenship, the creation of a 
government register of dual nationals was one 
of the included recommendations (p. 105). 
A forced unification of national identity from 
the top down may therefore not only be not 
desirable, it may in fact be doomed to fail. As 
Nicolette Bethel observed, in the case of The 
Bahamas, the “geographical archipelago is 
paralleled by a cognitive archipelago; 
Bahamian ‘identity’ is one which consists - 
and always has consisted—of multiple 
identities” (2000, p. 121). Nonetheless, Bethel 
asserts that a “strong sense of ‘Bahamian-
ness’ exists…” (p. 35). If for 41 years of 
Bahamian independence, and arguably for 
some time before that, the people have found 
pragmatic ways to shape their own identities, 
often in stark contrast to the central 
government, any politically motivated attempt 
at moulding the official Bahamian is bound to 
be rejected by the people and will result in a 
hollow shell. 
The mixed success of our national symbols 
may be symbolic of this. For the creation of 
our national symbols, the government utilised 
a populist process “by holding nation-wide 
competitions for their design” (Bethel, 2000, 
p. 17). Nonetheless they remained “by and 
large meaningless to the general populace, 
and had to be invested with significance in the 
years to come” (p. 17). Bahamians have 
grown fonder of some of these symbols than 
of others. The flag and its colours have 
become widely used to display Bahamian 
national pride during sanctioned events; the 
flag is easily reproduced, and everybody has 
an interpretation as to what the different 
elements mean. As an expression of national 
pride, however, the marlin and the flamingo in 
the coat of arms have been far less successful 
than their counterparts in many other 
countries; most Bahamians have never seen a 
marlin or flamingo in the wild. 
Of course, the coat of arms suffers from 
another handicap. During independence, it 
was decided to replace the Royal Navy ships 
depicted on the colonial coat of arms and flag, 
for Columbus’ flagship in the new one. In 
1973, this change represented a necessary 
break with our immediate British colonial 
past, and could rhetorically be justified by the 
historical significance of Columbus’ journey 
to world history in general, and, because of 
the coincidence of his landfall in this 
archipelago, to Bahamian history in particular. 
Yet, removing the images of Royal Navy 
vessels from the nation’s symbols only to 
replace them with another, even older symbol 
of European colonialism, speaks volumes of 
how ill-defined nation and nationalism were 
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at independence, and how ill equipped our 
founders were to rectify it. Anibal Quijano’s 
description of the coloniality of power (2000) 
is a useful model to describe the economic 
and political structures of the post-
independent Bahamas, but I posit that, in 
addition to Quijano’s model, a cultivated 
attitude I call “coloniority” perpetuates these 
patterns semi-consciously in today’s post-
colonial Bahamas: post-colonial elites 
celebrate colonial legacies through pomp and 
circumstance, titles and rituals, but these 
remain hollow, for the same elites that 
celebrate them yearn for the grandeur of the 
empire while subconsciously suffering from 
an inferiority complex that they are not—and 
never will be—equal to the metropolitan elites 
of old (Aranha, 2012). The inclusion of the 
Santa Maria was therefore as much a 
recognition of historical coincidence as it was 
a quiet nod to what many have accepted as the 
so-called civilising influences of colonialism. 
The elites’ coloniority, which causes them to 
cling to colonial forms, stands in stark 
contrast to the officially proclaimed self-
image that has been prescribed for the masses 
since independence: 
There were three main elements which 
went into the formation of a collective 
self-image: a sense of place, a sense of 
history, and a heightened awareness of 
the African origins of the nation’s black 
majority. … In the process of self-
definition, the most important element 
was the racial identity which the nation 
increasingly assumed. The emphasis 
placed on a black racial identity was a 
rejection of the white counter-identity of 
the recently ended period of white 
supremacy, in which the black majority 
has (in the society, economy, and in the 
history books) been marginalized. This 
new orientation was a reflection not 
only of black political power within the 
Bahamas but also of the influence of 
Black Power ideas from the United 
States (Johnson, 2000, p. 13). 
The discrepancy between the masses’ reality 
and the elites’ withdrawal to a parallel 
Orwellian farm where some animals are more 
equal than others is thus far mostly met with a 
sense of comical bewilderment, but it has also 
created an increased reluctance to accept the 
officially offered narratives. While during the 
Quincentennial in 1992, Bahamians were 
happy to exploit this history and its symbols 
for touristic-commercial purposes, the image 
of Columbus has suffered severely ever since. 
As could be seen during the decade-long 
debate about renaming the public holiday on 
12th October from Discovery Day to National 
Heroes Day, in the minds of many, Columbus 
personifies the evils of colonialism. However, 
National Heroes Day has yet to be filled with 
meaning, and the government’s proposal to 
establish a National Heroes Park at Clifton 
will ensure that for the majority of 
Bahamians, even those on New Providence, it 
will remain as remote an idea as its location.  
Ironically, one of the strongest symbols used 
for the purpose of national identification, 
especially by the younger generation, is not 
even an official national symbol: the area 
code for The Bahamas, 242, which only 
replaced the old 809, then shared by most of 
the Caribbean, in 1996. The success of these 
three numbers, aided no doubt by an online 
and mobile communications culture that 
favours brevity, shows that four decades after 
independence Bahamians are no longer 
buying into the prefabricated ideas of the 
nation prescribed by a generation of leaders 
closer in age to the Founding Fathers than to 
the median age of the population. 
Arguably, since the Constitution and the 
newly minted national identity were handed to 
the people at independence, the latter has 
developed separately while the former 
remained stagnant. They are no longer in 
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sync. The state would like to rein in the 
citizens' independent modifications to their 
national identity and only makes timid 
proposals for constitutional change. These, as 
has been discussed, will not adequately 
provide for inclusion and participation. 
The Constitution demands the electorate's 
approval in a referendum to effect 
constitutional change, but the electorate was 
never asked if it approved of the Constitution 
in the first place. Instead, the Constitution was 
the result of negotiations and deliberations in 
imperial London, with the British sitting at the 
table. This paradoxical genesis was discussed 
in the McWeeney Commission's report, too, 
but any genuine solution to this “only 
symbolic” p. 68) matter was dismissed as 
fraught with too many “practical difficulties” 
(p. 68). 
The conservative 2013 Report highlighted 
many issues with this product of colonialism, 
despite regularly shying away from 
recommending truly progressive reforms. 
Perhaps, rather than trying to fix a colonial 
constitution to better meet the needs of an 
independent Bahamas, it is time to imagine a 
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